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Abstract
Evidence from studies in international relations, the politics of reform, collective
action and price competition suggests that economic agents in social dilemma situ-
ations cooperate more to avoid losses than in the pursuit of gains. To test whether
the prospect of losses can induce cooperation, we let experimental subjects play
the traveler’s dilemma in the gain and loss domain. Subjects cooperate substan-
tially more over losses. Our experimental design allows us to show that this treat-
ment effect is best explained by reference-dependent risk preferences and reference-
dependent strategic sophistication. We discuss policy implications and relate our
findings to other experimental games played in the loss domain.
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1 Introduction
In many important contexts it is socially efficient for two or more agents to
cooperate, yet the cooperative outcome leaves each agent with an incentive to de-
viate at the expense of the others. How cooperation can be sustained in such social
dilemmas has been the focus of several literatures across the social sciences. But
one empirical observation has thus far evaded a convincing unifying explanation:
cooperation thrives when agents perceive themselves to be in the loss domain.
A number of studies in international relations find that the threat of losses, more
than the promise of gains, induces national governments to cooperate on multilateral
economic surveillance and military strategy (Stein and Pauly, 1992; Mercer, 2005).1
Within countries, reforms are often spurred by crises (Weyland, 2002; Vis, 2009).
Where inefficient policies are the non-cooperative outcome of a game between polit-
ical stakeholders, crises can bring about a switch to more cooperative policymaking
(Velasco, 1998; Tommasi, 2004). Being put in the loss domain by a crisis appears to
equip policy makers, the electorate and other stakeholders with the risk tolerance
required to pursue risky reforms and cooperation (Weyland, 1996; Tommasi, 2004;
Vis and Van Kersbergen, 2007).
Collective action to revolt seems puzzling in light of individuals’ incentives to
freeride or defect (Coleman, 1994; Moore, 1995). According to Berejikian (1992) and
Fanis (2004) it is the threat of losses that helps individuals overcome the freeriding
problem and engage in a revolt. In the context of organised labor, the credible threat
of a strike in response to wage cuts may help explain the downward stickiness of
wages.2
Price competition between firms is less fierce during economic downturns (Rotem-
berg and Saloner, 1986).3 Bertrand competition is a social dilemma and bad demand
conditions may lead to more cooperative, or collusive, outcomes, because they put
managers in the loss domain.
Of course, these examples admit separate explanations that do not rely on
1It has been argued that the threat of losses motivated the international cooperation of setting
up the Bretton Woods agreement (Pauly, 1992); lead to the Structural Impediments Initiative of
1989-1990, which saw Japan and the United States agree to costly domestic reforms in order to
facilitate a better trading relationship (Mastanduno, 1992); and was the foundation of Israel’s
cooperation with the US during the Gulf war (Welch, 1992).
2Kahn (1997) documents workers’ and firms’ resistance to nominal pay cuts and interprets
it as evidence that current wage levels constitute an important reference point. Bewley (2002)
provides additional evidence and explanations for the downward rigidity of wages.
3Rojas (2012) and Ruffle (2013) show this effect in experimental games. Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986) explain it as the outcome of a repeated game, in which low demand decreases the
temptation to cheat.
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whether agents perceive payoffs as gains or as losses. Moreover, the causal im-
pact of losses on strategic behaviour is hard to establish in the field. We therefore
conduct a controlled laboratory experiment that has subjects play a once-off, anony-
mous social dilemma and varies exogenously whether payoffs are framed as gains or
as losses. Our experiment is also designed to investigate how the prospect of losses
impacts on cooperation.
We find that subjects cooperate substantially more in the loss domain and that
this treatment effect is driven by subjects exhibiting 1) greater risk tolerance and
2) less strategic sophistication when losses are at stake. Strategic uncertainty or
noisy decision making imply that moving away from the least cooperative action of
our experimental game may yield a higher expected payoff. But cooperation also
exposes a player to the downside risk of being undercut. Because our subjects are
more risk tolerant over losses, as implied by prospect theory’s diminishing sensi-
tivity (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), they are more likely to embrace the gamble
cooperation entails. Our subjects are also more prone to making strategic mistakes
in the loss domain and, as we show, in high-risk social dilemmas, mistakes take the
form of more cooperative play.
Our experimental game is the traveler’s dilemma (henceforth TD), in which
two players simultaneously submit claims that may take any value between a lower
bound and an upper bound (Basu, 1994). Both players then receive the lower of the
two submitted claims and a reward of size R is paid to the player making the lower
claim, while a penalty of size R is deducted from the payoff of the player making
the larger claim. Therefore, each player has an incentive to minimally undercut the
other and in the unique Nash equilibrium both players claim the lower bound of
the action space, regardless of the risk embodied in the size of the reward/penalty
parameter R.
The TD captures the basic trade-off between what is privately and socially
optimal that characterises our motivating examples. Yet, its simple payoff structure
entails that it is easily explained to experimental subjects. Compared to its close
relative, the prisoner’s dilemma, it delivers a rich distribution of actions and thus
facilitates estimating the structural model we use to get at the mechanism that
drives our treatment effect. The TD is preferable to linear public good games
because these lack the uncertainty about the marginal private returns to cooperation
that characterises the real-world social dilemmas we seek to capture. At the same
time, it is analytically simpler than step-level public good games that contain said
uncertainty, but often feature multiple equilibria.
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We implement two main treatments. In the gain treatment admissible claims lie
between 3 and 8 Euros. In the loss treatment subjects are given 11 Euros in cash
for their participation at the beginning of the experiment and then stand to lose
money, with admissible claims ranging from -8 to -3 Euros. In both treatments the
reward/penalty parameter R takes a value of 3 Euros and subjects play the game
repeatedly, being anonymously matched with a new partner each time. The loss and
gain treatments differ only in how payoffs are framed4 and would be equivalent if
subjects were expected utility maximisers or if our framing did not have an impact
on subjects’ reference points or strategic sophistication.
We find large differences in the behaviour across our two treatments. In early
periods, average claims in the loss treatment are up to 1.42 Euros or 42 percent
higher than in the gain treatment. As learning sets in and strategic uncertainty is
reduced, claims eventually converge to Nash play in both treatments. Therefore,
the treatment effect is likely to arise in surprising, complicated or uncertain settings
in which other agents’ motivations and constraints are not perfectly understood, as
would be the case in most markets or political systems and during crises.
As a preliminary step toward understanding the drivers of our treatment ef-
fect, we analyse analytically how best to play the TD in the presence of strategic
uncertainty, which we model as stemming from an unsophisticated opponent who
sometimes deviates from Nash play.5 We show that our treatment effect can be ex-
plained by subjects exhibiting either more risk tolerance, more altruism or a higher
propensity to make mistakes in the loss domain.
Next, we consider the interaction between players of several different levels of
sophistication in a cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2004) that
we augment to allow for, respectively, curvature in players’ utility function and
other-regarding preferences. Structural parameter estimates indicate that the ex-
perimental data is best matched by a model that supposes that subjects are either
1) more risk tolerant and 2) less sophisticated or 1̂) more altruistic and 2̂) less so-
phisticated when they make decisions in the loss domain. Both of these models
4Suppose, for example, player 1 chooses the fully cooperative action, which is 8 in the gain
treatment and -3 in the loss treatment, and player 2 undercuts her by 0.1. Then, in both the
loss and the gain treatment, player 1 leaves the experiment with 4.9 Euros and player 2 with 10.9
Euros.
5In the absence of uncertainty, neither risk preferences nor plausible social preferences can
explain cooperation in the TD. Noisy behaviour in the TD is also empirically plausible: Oppen-
heimer, Wendel and Frohlich (2011) find that from period to period, behaviour of many individuals
in social dilemmas appears to be almost random. Furthermore, models premised on noisy decision
making do well at explaining the effect of changing the reward/penalty parameter on subjects’
behaviour in the TD (Capra et al., 1999).
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provide a better fit to the data than a model based solely on differences in strategic
sophistication.
Finally, we make use of the fact that we elicit subjects’ risk and social preferences
as well as their propensity to make mistakes in strategic reasoning. We find that
risk tolerance and propensity to make mistakes are higher in the loss domain. In
the first test of gain-loss asymmetries in social preferences we are aware of, we find
that dictator game giving is not responsive to the gain-loss frame. Furthermore,
within subject correlations of preferences, sophistication and strategic behaviour
suggest that a higher risk tolerance and propensity to make mistakes, but not dic-
tator game giving, are associated with higher claims in the TD for the average
subject. Therefore, treatment effects on individually elicited preference and mea-
sures of sophistication as well as within subject correlations of said variables with
strategic behaviour suggest that reference-dependent risk preferences and reference-
dependent strategic sophistication, but not reference-dependent social preferences,
drive cooperation in the loss domain. Suggestive evidence from a questionnaire after
the experiment corroborates this explanation.
We introduce two additional treatments to test the scope of our risk- and noise-
based explanation. In the gain-loss treatment both gains and losses are possible.
We find that subjects’ behaviour exhibits a form of loss avoidance (Cachon and
Camerer, 1996): subjects predominantly choose the action that minimises their
risk of loosing money. In line with our explanation of behaviour in the two main
treatments, the utility function we estimate in the gain-loss treatment has the S-
shape implied by diminishing sensitivity and its steepest gradient, i.e. its implied
reference point, at the experimentally induced reference point.
In a further treatment we set the reward/punishment parameter to 0.5. Com-
pared to the case of R = 3, we find higher cooperation in both the loss and the gain
domain. Moreover, when R = 0.5, subjects cooperate slightly more in the gain than
in the loss domain. This is consistent with our main results. Out-of-sample predic-
tions of a cognitive hierarchy model that is parametrised using the data from the
R = 3 treatments match the empirical means of this low-risk treatment. Naturally,
risk preferences matter less in low-risk situations and mistakes imply less coopera-
tion when high cooperativeness is privately optimal for sophisticated players.
This paper makes two main contributions. First, it corroborates suggestive evi-
dence from the field that the prospect of losses causes economic agents to cooperate,
while ruling out explanations that do not rely on the gain-loss frame. Second, it
uncovers the mechanism behind this treatment effect: reference-dependent strategic
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sophistication and reference-dependent risk preferences.
In the following section we relate our paper to the broader experimental liter-
ature. In section 3, we describe our experimental design and results. Section 4 is
concerned with understanding the drivers of our treatment effect. Further treat-
ments, in section 5, show that our explanation can account for changes in subjects’
behaviour that occur once we alter the strategic environment. Section 6 concludes
and highlights some policy implications.
2 Related experimental literature
Some studies in experimental economics compare subjects’ propensity to con-
tribute to public goods to their propensity to take from common resources (see
Fosgaard, Hansen and Wengström (2014) or Cox (2015) for a list of papers in this
literature).6 In these experiments, strategically equivalent public good games are
presented to subjects under either a giving frame (public good) or a taking frame
(common resource). The latter may conceivably also evoke a loss frame if subjects
integrate the common resource into their wealth.7 Evidence is mixed, with sev-
eral studies finding higher contributions under the giving frame and several other
studies, including a large sample experiment by Fosgaard, Hansen and Wengström
(2014), finding the opposite. Our paper differs along two dimensions from these
experiments and we do not take a strong stand on their findings. First, in line with
our motivating examples, we do not vary the moral frame on subjects’ action space,
but rather attempt to vary the reference point of their payoff function. Second,
the linear public good games typically featured in the above experiments have a
dominant strategy. To capture the inherent riskiness of our motivating examples,
our game does not. If agents are self-interested, a dominant strategy implies that
risk preferences should not impact on behaviour.
Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. (2011) study a public good game without a dominant
strategy, in which the good is only provided if k individuals contribute. Consistent
with our results, they find that, when k is equal to the group size, framing the public
good game as a game of taking from a common resource increases contributions.
These findings can be rationalised not only by loss aversion, as the authors show,
6In the field, Ostrom (1990) argues that groups frequently overcome individual incentives to
exploit open access common pool resources such as forests and fisheries, especially when appro-
priators are very dependent on the resource and its risk of depletion is high (Ostrom, 2000).
7See Cox (2015) for a discussion of how take/give and gain/loss frames may be confounded in
some of these studies.
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but also by diminishing sensitivity. In their game, the benefit of consuming a public
good outweighs the cost of contributing. When the whole group needs to contribute
for the public good to be created, contributing is risky in that it yields the public
good minus the cost of contributing if everybody else is contributing and only costs
if at least one person fails to contribute. Not contributing, on the other hand, is safe
and yields zero payoffs with certainty. As a result, we expect more contributions
under a taking or loss frame that makes subjects are more risk tolerant.8
Some experiments in psychology compare prisoner’s dilemma play in the gain
and loss domain, but no clear treatment effect emerges (see De Dreu and McCusker
(1997) and De Heus, Hoogervorst and Van Dijk (2010) for reviews of the evidence).
Similar to the linear public good game, the prisoner’s dilemma has a dominant strat-
egy and risk preferences are irrelevant if a player is self-interested. Interestingly,
however, De Dreu and McCusker (1997) find that individuals they characterise as
collaborators do in fact cooperate more in the loss domain. This is in line with our
findings. An individual with sufficiently strong social preferences like inequity aver-
sion, for example, obtains the highest utility from both parties cooperating, while
cooperating and being defected upon constitutes the worst-case scenario. When
there is strategic uncertainty, defecting is therefore not a dominant strategy for col-
laborators and risk preferences matter in determining their favoured action much
like they do in the TD. Also consistent with this, Mengel (2014) finds evidence that
the downside risk of cooperating is the most important driver of cooperation in
prisoner’s dilemmas with random matching.
In a two-player game of chicken, player 1’s preference ordering over outcomes
is given by (defect, cooperate) ≻ (cooperate, cooperate) ≻ (cooperate, defect) ≻
(defect, defect). De Heus, Hoogervorst and Van Dijk (2010) find that individuals
cooperate less when they play the game of chicken in the loss domain. They argue
that the payoff structure of the game implies that defecting is the high-potential-
reward and high-variance action and that subjects defect more frequently in the
loss domain because of diminishing sensitivity. Their findings lend support to our
risk-preference based explanation and highlight the importance of a game’s exact
payoff structure in shaping gain-loss differences in strategic behaviour. The chicken
game is also a social dilemma, but the TD’s assumption that (defect, defect) ≻
(cooperate, defect) better fits our motivating examples.
8When k = 1, subjects in Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. (2011) contribute less under the taking
or loss frame. Of course, when a single contribution is enough to create the public good, not
contributing becomes the high variance action and higher risk tolerance implies a lower likelihood
of contributing.
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The TD can be taken to capture a setting of imperfect price competition be-
tween two firms with differentiated products or capacity constraints.9 The effect of
the loss treatment then captures the anticompetitive effects of sunk costs or bad
demand conditions. Offerman and Potters (2006) find that auctioning off entry
fees or imposing fixed sunk costs in a Bertrand oligopoly increases collusion among
experimental entrants, Kachelmeier (1996) finds that sunk costs have no effect in
a double auction and Buchheit and Feltovich (2011) find that experimental market
prices are first increasing and then decreasing in sunk costs. Our experiment dif-
fers in that it is simpler and explicitly designed to induce losses and uncover the
mechanism behind our treatment effect.
Previous experiments featuring the TD show that for low values of R relative
to the upper bound, claims are clustered around the highest possible claim (Capra
et al., 1999; Goeree and Holt, 2001; Becker, Carter and Naeve, 2005; Rubinstein,
2007), a result we replicate in section 5.2. As the reward/penalty parameter grows
larger, however, claims converge to the Nash equilibrium play (Capra et al., 1999;
Goeree and Holt, 2001). This comparative static in R is well explained by models
of noisy decision making (Capra et al., 1999) and models of strategic uncertainty
(Baghestanian, 2014), suggesting that, as we assume, uncertainty plays a key role
in driving behaviour in the TD. These previous experiments also helped us calibrate
our experimental game and rendered a pilot unnecessary.
We explain our treatment effect by asserting that subjects are less risk averse
and less sophisticated in the loss domain. Diminishing sensitivity (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979), has been documented in the decision making of experimental sub-
jects and the general population (Booij, Praag and van de Kuilen, 2010; Tymula
et al., 2012). In a review of studies that estimate the curvature of individuals’ utility
functions in the gain and loss domain 9 out of 11 studies find risk loving preferences
in the loss domain and risk aversion in the gain domain (Booij, Praag and van de
Kuilen, 2010). Camerer (2003) provides some examples from the field. However,
our explanation is based on a weaker condition than diminishing sensitivity: we
merely require that individuals are less risk averse in the loss domain.
In line with our result on subjects’ sophistication, Tymula et al. (2012) find
that in a sample of over 8000 individual choices, stochastic dominance violations
in choices between simple lotteries and certain payoffs are more likely in the loss
domain. In line with our result that dictator game giving is not correlated with
9See Capra et al. (2002) for an experiment in which firms engage in Bertrand competition and
the firm setting the higher price has a non-vanishing market share. In this case, the size of the
residual market is the counterpart of the reward/penalty parameter in the TD.
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actions in the TD, Brañas-Garza, Espinosa and Rey-Biel (2011) document that
pro-social considerations are absent from a subjects’ ex-post explanation of the
action they chose in a TD experiment.
3 Experimental design and results
3.1 Design
We let subjects in a computerised experiment play the traveler’s dilemma, in







xi +R if xi < xj
xj −R if xi > xj
xi if xi = xj
.
Subjects were randomly assigned to sessions belonging to either a gain or a
loss treatment. In the gain treatment, subjects received no participation fee and
admissible claims lay between 3 and 8 Euros. In the loss treatment, they received
a participation fee of 11 Euros before the experiment and admissible claims lay
between -8 and -3 Euros. Subjects then had to reimburse the experimenter for any
losses they incurred. R was set equal to 3 Euros in both treatments.
In a first set of sessions, which we call experiment 1, subjects played the TD five
times10 and the action set was finely grained: any multiple of 0.1 Euros between
the lower and upper bound of the claims range was admissible. In a second set
of sessions, which we call experiment 2, we let subjects play the TD ten times
and elicited risk preferences, social preferences and propensity to make mistakes
in strategic reasoning. In experiment 2, we also wanted to check how results in
experiment 1 extend to a coarser action set and thus restricted claims to be multiples
0.5.
In both experiments, we paired each subject with a different person in each
period to avoid dynamic strategic considerations and we used a randomly selected
period to determine final earnings to avoid wealth effects. In experiment 2, periods
that featured preference elicitation tasks were also eligible to be selected for pay-
ment. The TD was introduced to subjects in its abstract form (see the instructions
in appendix C).






• elicitation of risk preferences
over gains
• 10 periods of the TD over gains
• elicitation of social preferences
over gains.
Part B:
• 3 AC fee





• 11 AC fee
• elicitation of risk preferences
over losses
• 10 periods of the TD over losses
• elicitation of social preferences
over losses.
Part B:
• 9 AC fee;
• quiz on the TD with a penalty
for wrong answers
Part C: questionnaire
Table 1 The sequencing of tasks in experiment 2
We conducted a total of twelve experimental sessions at the Toulouse School of
Economics experimental laboratory with student subjects.11 The experiment was
programmed on z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Experiment 1 was designed to demonstrate the treatment effect in a clean fash-
ion, without contamination or excessive cognitive load from other tasks. Experiment
2 serves to investigate the drivers of the treatment effect we observe. It also provides
a view of how play evolves in later periods.
Table 1 depicts the design of experiment 2. The dashed arrows indicate that we
switched the timing of risk and social preference elicitation in half of the sessions,
in order to detect potential order effects. Payoffs from preference elicitation periods
were only revealed at the end of part A. Part B of the experiment came as a surprise
and subjects were paid for it separately.
Risk preferences. We elicited risk preferences by letting subjects choose between
different lotteries, as in Holt and Laury (2002) (see table 7 in appendix B). Out-
comes of lotteries in the loss treatment were 11 Euro less than those in the gain
treatment and thereby fully embedded in the loss domain. The HL switching point
refers to the least favourable pair of lotteries for which a subject prefers the riskier
11Experiment 1 featured two sessions under the gain treatment (34 subjects), two under the loss
treatment (32 subjects) and two under the gain-loss treatment (34 subjects) described in section
5.1. Sessions lasted less than 30 minutes and subjects earned on average 6.30 Euros. Experiment 2
featured three sessions under the gain treatment (36 subjects) and three under the loss treatment
(42 subjects). Sessions lasted 45 minutes and subjects earned on average 9.80 Euros.
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one. It is increasing in risk aversion. As a second non-strategic risk preferences
elicitation task, we let subjects play the TD of the corresponding treatment against
the computer, which was programmed to choose each claim with equal probability.
The more risk averse a subject is, the lower her risk TD claim should be.
Social preferences. To elicit social preferences, we paired each subject with a
randomly selected anonymous partner.12 In a dictator game (see table 8 in appendix
B), dictators in the gain treatment had to choose how to split 8 Euros with their
partners, while dictators in the loss treatment had to choose how to allocate a loss
of 8 Euros. The more prosocial a subject is, the higher her dictator giving should
be, i.e. the higher the dictator game payoff she allocates to her partner. As in the
risk preference elicitation, each subject also played the TD of her corresponding
treatment against a computer that randomly chose claims. This time, however, the
computer’s payoff went to the subject’s partner. The difference between choices
in this task, which we denote by social TD claim, and the risk TD claim provides
another measure of prosociality.
Mistakes and strategic sophistication. In part B of experiment 2 we elicited
subjects’ strategic sophistication by presenting them with a quiz featuring 8 ques-
tions of varying degrees of difficulty, ranging from simple questions on the payoff
structure to more advanced questions on optimal actions conditional on an oppo-
nent’s behaviour. Hypothetical payoffs and actions in the quiz were framed accord-
ing to the treatment the subject was in. Furthermore, subjects in the gain treatment
earned 0.5 Euros for a correct answer, while subjects in the loss treatment lost 0.5
Euros for a wrong answer. The quiz thus captured the effect of incentivising subjects
through losses as well as the difficulty subjects may experience in thinking in terms
of losses. We also elicited subjects’ beliefs about their own and others’ performance
in the quiz, while providing incentives for accuracy as high as 2 Euros. The initial
fees for part B were 3 and 9 Euros in the gain and loss treatment respectively.13
Part C consisted of a questionnaire on the motives behind subjects’ choices in
the TD (see tables 10 and 11 in appendix B).
12In order to provide proper incentives without losing observations, each subject performed all
social preference elicitation tasks. Then, with equal probability, either her choice or that of her
partner determined earnings for the period.
13The fees are such that a given number of correct answers yields identical earnings in the two
treatments.
10









(a) Distribution of claims

















(b) Average claims per period
Figure 1 The treatment effect in experiment 1
3.2 The treatment effect
Figure 1a depicts the gain and loss treatments’ distributions of claims, pooling all
5 periods of experiment 1. For the sake of comparability, we present results in terms
of net claims, which obtain by adding the participation fee of the corresponding
treatment to actual claims.14 The distribution in the gain treatment has most of
its mass concentrated around the Nash equilibrium at 3, while the distribution in
the loss treatment is more dispersed, with a single peak around the centre of the
action set and a higher mean. The mass around the most cooperative action (i.e.
8) is similar in both treatments.
Figure 1b shows average claims per period. In all periods, claims are higher in
the loss treatment than in the gain treatment and this difference is significant at
the 1 percent level according to both a t-test and a Wilcoxon rank sum test. In
period 5, the average claim is 3.51 Euros in the gain treatment and 4.96 Euros in
the loss treatment. Framing payoffs as losses therefore increases cooperation by up
to 41 percent.
Our results also indicate that subjects’ behaviour departs substantially from
Nash equilibrium, especially in the loss treatment. They are therefore inconsistent
with the assumption of fully rational players.
14That is, we translate claims in the loss treatment to claims into the action space of the gain
treatment by adding 11 Euros.
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4 Explaining the treatment effect
4.1 A stylised model of strategic uncertainty
To gain an intuition for how bounded rationality, risk preferences and social
preferences may shape behaviour in the TD, it is useful to transform the game
into a non-strategic decision problem.15 Suppose that player 1, a rational agent,
is playing the TD with player 2, a non-strategic opponent, who plays the Nash
equilibrium strategy x2 = 3 with probability (1− p) ∈ [0, 1] and x2 = m+ 0.1 with
complementary probability, where m > 3.16 We may interpret p as the probability
of a mistake and m as its size, so that both p and m are measures of player 2’s lack
of sophistication.
Assume first that player 1 is self-interested and that her utility is given by U(z1),
where z1 represents her material payoff and U ′(z1) > 0. Faced with player 2, player
1 then only has two sensible choices: she may either play her Nash strategy x1 = 3,
or she may try to capitalise on player 2’s mistake by minimally undercutting, i.e.
by playing x1 = m. Given the payoff structure of the TD, player 1 finds it optimal
to play x1 = m if and only if
(1− p)U(3−R) + pU(m+R) > (1− p)U(3) + pU(3 +R). (1)
When player 1 plays x1 = m instead of x1 = 3, she risks being undercut in situations
in which player 2 does not make a mistake. This downside risk associated with
moving away from the Nash outcome is a key feature of the social dilemmas in
the uncertain environments we outline in the introduction.17 Crucially, the spread
of payoffs is higher on the left-hand side of equation (1) than on the right-hand
side: the minimum and maximum payoffs from playing x1 = m are respectively
lower and higher than the minimum and maximum payoffs from playing x1 = 3.
Player 1 therefore has to decide between two gambles with equal probabilities but
different variances. A risk loving player 1 is more comfortable with a higher variance
in payoffs and thus more comfortable with playing x1 = m than a risk averse
15The more elaborate model we adopt in the next section cannot be solved for analytically,
which makes getting at the intuition behind comparative statics harder.
16Without loss of generality we are implicitly assuming here that the TD is played with the
fine action set.
17The downside risk would also be present if player 1 was choosing whether to defect or coop-
erate in a prisoners’ dilemma. However, contrary to the TD, in a prisoner’s dilemma, cooperating
never yields higher utility for a self-interested individual. For a sufficiently altruistic individual,
on the other hand, (cooperate, cooperate) may be the favoured prisoners’ dilemma outcome.
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individual.
We define a risk averse, a risk neutral and a risk loving individual as an individual
whose utility function is characterised by U ′′(z1) < 0, U ′′(z1) = 0 and U ′′(z1) > 0
respectively and we index them by a, n and l. The following proposition (all proofs
for this section can be found in appendix A) then establishes more formally the
above intuition, as well as that cooperating is more attractive when mistakes on
behalf of player 2 are large and frequent.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique threshold p∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
- player 1 claims x1 = m if and only if p > p
∗ and x1 = 3 otherwise;
- p∗ is decreasing in m;
- p∗ is lower for a risk loving than for a risk neutral individual and higher for a risk





Let us now assume risk neutrality and allow for social preferences on behalf
of player 1. In particular, suppose that the utility of player 1 takes the form of
U(z1; z2) = z1 + βz2, where z2 is the material payoff of player 2 and β ∈ (0, 1) a
measure of player 1’s altruism.18 The following proposition shows that altruism,
like risk lovingness, provides an incentive for player 1 to deviate from Nash play
and that this incentive is stronger the less sophisticated player 2 is:
Proposition 2. There exists a unique threshold p∗β ∈ (0, 1) such that
- player 1 deviates from x1 = 3 if and only if p > p
∗
β;
- p∗β is decreasing in m and β.
Propositions 1 and 2 tell us that changes in risk preferences and altruism can
systematically impact on subjects’ tendency to cooperate in a TD with underlying
uncertainty. Since we observe that individuals cooperate more in the loss domain,
the propositions imply that the treatment effect could be accounted for by higher
levels of risk lovingness or altruism in the loss domain. Of course, a higher propen-
sity to make mistakes, as reflected in a higher p, or larger mistakes, as reflected in
a larger m, would also lead to more frequent deviations from Nash. In this stylised
example, player 2 does not react strategically to player 1’s actions. The next section
demonstrates that the simple intuitions developed here have bite when we allow for
a larger set of strategic types.
18We model prosocial considerations in the simplest possible way, but results generalise to other
other-regarding preferences. For instance, if player 1’s utility is as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
similar predictions obtain based on her aversion to advantageous inequality.
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4.2 Estimates from a cognitive hierarchy model
The structural estimations of this section can be viewed as a comparative statics
exercise that maps the experimental data from our two treatments into implied
differences in risk preferences, social preferences and sophistication. Results indicate
that an explanation based on less sophistication in the loss domain alone does a
bad job at explaining the treatment effect, but they do not allow us to distinguish
between explanations that feature either reference-dependent risk preferences and
reference-dependent sophistication or reference-dependent social preferences and
reference-dependent sophistication.
We adopt an augmented version of the cognitive hierarchy model in Camerer,
Ho and Chong (2004). Subjects belong to different steps of sophistication, indexed
by an integer k. Steps in the population follow a Poisson distribution parametrised
by t, both the distribution’s mean and variance. Each step k > 0 player myopically
believes to be the most sophisticated player and, in particular, that the distribution
of other players follows a Poisson distribution parametrised by t, but right-truncated










Each step k > 0 player maximises her expected utility U e(x) given her beliefs
specified in (2) and anticipating that each step h < k behaves in a similar fashion.
The model solves recursively after specifying the behaviour of step 0 players. We
assume that a fraction 1− w of step 0 players randomise over the action set, while
the remaining fraction w play the highest action.19
With the exception of Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2002) and Goeree, Holt and
Palfrey (2003), experimental papers that make use of models of noisy strategic
interactions impose that players are risk neutral and selfish. In order to capture
risk attitudes, we adopt the more general functional form U(z1) = zα1 , where z1
represents a player’s material payoff.20 Then, α < 1, α = 1 and α > 1 respectively
capture risk aversion, neutrality and lovingness. We also consider an alternative
model with altruism, in which utility takes the form U(z1; z1) = z1 + βz2, where z2
is the material payoff of the other player.
19Arad and Rubinstein (2012) adopt a similar specification for the behaviour of level 0 players
in a game which bears some similarities with the TD. Qualitative results are robust to imposing
that w = 0.
20As we run all estimations using net claims, there is no need to define U(z1) piecewise for the
gain and the loss domain.
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Both models have three parameters, respectively (t, w, α) and (t, w, β), and solve
numerically for any parameter values. Using maximum likelihood techniques, we
determine which combination of parameters best replicates the observed distribution
of our subjects’ actions in each period. The trends in figure 1b might be interpreted
as evidence of learning as play progresses, which in the models would translate into
higher values of t and lower values of w. Conversely, there is no a priori reason
to expect α or β to change across periods. We therefore also estimate each model
jointly over the five periods under the respective restriction that α or β remain
constant.
Table 2 reports estimates of the model that allows for different risk preferences.
Estimates of α confirm the link between risk preferences on cooperation established
in section 4.1.21 For instance, in the joint model we obtain α̂ = 0.95 in the gain
treatment and α̂ = 3.25 in the loss treatment. We use a likelihood ratio test that
compares these models with a model that imposes the risk-neutrality restriction
(α = 1) to check whether estimates of α are significantly different from 1. In the
loss treatment we are able to reject risk-neutrality in favour of risk-lovingness at the
1 percent significance level. In the gain treatment we cannot reject risk neutrality.
These results are confirmed in the models that are estimated over individual periods.
Thus, the model that best matches the observed distribution of actions is one that
supposes individuals are more risk tolerant in the loss domain.
Estimates of t suggest that the average subject is also less sophisticated in the
loss domain.22 But the likelihood ratio test on the restriction of risk neutrality
21One can show numerically that the optimal action of a step 1 player (and hence of all more
sophisticated players) is weakly increasing in α and coincides with Nash play when α is lower than
some cutoff ᾱ(w), where ᾱ(w) is decreasing in w and ᾱ(0) = 65 . When the likelihood attains the
maximum in the α < ᾱ region, in case of multiple maximizers we adopt the convention to select
the largest α.
22Overall, values of t are a slightly smaller than typical estimates from the literature. This is
due to the fact that the action set is large, play is fairly dispersed and k > 0 players overall use
only a small set of actions. Thus, the model attributes actions outside this set to step 0 players.
To control for this feature, we also estimated a variation of the cognitive hierarchy model that
allows for noisy optimising behaviour, similarly to Lim, Matros and Turoc (2014). That is, a
logistic decision rule specifies that given her beliefs, a level k > 0 player chooses each action x in












where µ is a parameter that measures the sensitivity of choice probabilities to payoffs. This models
yields higher estimates of t in both treatments. We report results from the standard model because
it yields qualitatively similar results and is computationally less burdensome. Besides, under noisy
optimising behaviour, we need to make additional restrictions to separately identify risk and noise
15
Table 2 Estimates of risk preferences in a cognitive hierarchy model
Treatment Period Restriction α t w LogL
Gain 1 None 0.95 0.31 0.2 −110.038
(0.12) (0.102) (0.09)
2 None 1.1 0.51 0.06 −99.640
(0.062) (0.155) (0.059)
3 None 1.15 0.56 0.01 −94.173
(0.034) (0.156) 0.034
4 None 1.15 0.9 0.01 −77.958
(0.034) (0.222) (0.034)
5 None 1.05 1.3 0.11 −53.938
(0.123) (0.268) (0.101)
all 5 α const 0.95 −435.75
Loss 1 None 6*** 0.11 0.11 −117.161
(1.716) (0.065) (0.062)
2 None 2.3*** 0.16 0.06 −118.671
(0.678) (0.082) (0.054)
None 4.0*** 0.26 0.06 −119.08
(0.56) (0.113) (0.053)
4 None 3.25*** 0.21 0.01 −116.868
(0.434) (0.094) (0.027)
5 None 1.5 0.16 0.06 −121.53
(0.88) (0.084) (0.039)
all 5 α const 3.25*** −609.095
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; significance levels from a likelihood-
ratio test against the restriction α = 1: * (p < 0.1), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
implies that risk-preferences in combination with sophistication fares better at ex-
plaining our treatment effect than an explanation based on less sophistication in
the loss domain alone. Note also that estimates of t show a clear increasing pattern
over periods in the gain treatment but less so in the loss treatment, while estimates
of w tend to decrease in both treatments.
Table 3 presents estimates of the model that allows for altruism. Estimates
confirm the prediction of section 4.1 that more altruism in the loss domain can also
explain our treatment effect. Moreover, the log-likelihoods of the models featur-
ing risk preferences and the models featuring altruism are very similar. A social-
preference based explanation thus fits the aggregate data just as well as a risk-based
explanation.
parameters (see Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2002) for details) because estimates of noise are sensitive
to the scale of payoffs.
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Table 3 Estimates of altruism in a cognitive hierarchy model
Treatment Period Restriction β t w LogL
Gain 1 None 0 0.31 0.15 −110.092
(0.02) (0.103) (0.04)
2 None 0.05 0.51 0.075 −99.592
(0.024) (0.15) 0.052)
3 None 0.05 0.61 0 −93.925
(0.007) (0.172) (0.025)
4 None 0.05 0.86 0 −77.803
(0.029) (0.233) (0.031)
5 None 0 1.31 0.1 −53.926
(0.025) (0.34) (0.063)
all 5 β const 0 −435.34
Loss 1 None 0.9*** 0.11 0.1 −117.015
(0.273) (0.061) (0.064)
2 None 0.3*** 0.15 0.025 −118.856
(0.121) (0.08) (0.03)
3 None 0.35*** 0.26 0.15 −120
(0.059) (0.109) (0.052)
4 None 0.4*** 0.21 0 −117.022
(0.068) (0.096) (0.011)
5 None 0.05 0.11 0 −121.595
(0.239) (0.052) (0.022)
all 5 β const 0.4*** −605.911
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; significance levels from a likelihood-
ratio test against the restriction β = 0: * (p < 0.1), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
4.3 Determinants of the treatment effect
4.3.1 The treatment effect on strategic behaviour in experiment 2
We designed experiment 2 to measure social preferences, risk preferences and
sophistication directly. This allows us to better identify the drivers of our treat-
ment effect by checking for treatment effects on these variables and by looking at
within subject correlations between preferences, mistakes and strategic behaviour.
By adding three more sessions in each treatment, experiment 2 also increases the
statistical power behind our statement that TD play is more cooperative in the loss
domain.
Figure 2 depicts average net claims in experiments 1 and 2 across periods and
by treatment. In experiment 2, claims are significantly higher in the loss treatment

















Gain treatment (experiment 2)
Loss treatment (experiment 2)
Gain treatment (experiment 1)
Loss treatment (experiment 1)
Figure 2 Average claims per period in experiment 2
the treatment difference in claims in each of the the first eight periods is significant
at the 5 percent level, except in period 3, where it is significant at the 10 percent
level.
At the same time, the treatment effect on strategic behaviour is smaller in exper-
iment 2 than in experiment 1. Our favoured explanation for this is the coarser action
set of experiment 2 (11 instead of 51 actions). A subject who plans to minimally
undercut her opponent in experiment 2 mechanically has to choose a lower claim
than a subject in experiment 1.23 Alternatively, the preference elicitation tasks that
preceded the 10 periods of TD play may contribute to the smaller treatment effect
by influencing a subject’s expectation about her opponent’s behaviour.
Experiment 2 also allows us to observe TD play after 5 periods. In the final
periods of the experiment we observe convergence to Nash equilibrium play in both
treatments. Capra et al. (1999) explain this decreasing pattern of claims by alluding
to a process of learning. As subjects start to better predict their opponent’s action
or modify their behaviour on the basis of negative and positive reinforcement, play
evolves towards the Nash action. As uncertainty decreases, risk preferences too are
likely to play a less important role. Comparing earlier and later periods therefore
nicely demonstrates that our treatment effect and theory are likely to be more
23This effect of coarseness is consistent with the logic of cognitive hierarchy models, in which
players undercut each other in ascending order of sophistication. A quantal response equilibrium
model, as in Capra et al. (1999), cannot directly account for this effect.
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pertinent in noisy and uncertain settings. Arguably, most real world social dilemmas
take place in precisely such environments.
4.3.2 Treatment effects on preferences and mistakes
The individual decision making tasks of experiment 2 help us further identify
the most plausible mechanism underlying our treatment effect. For either risk
preferences, social preferences or sophistication to constitute a valid part of the ex-
planation of our treatment effect, the variable in question, when measured directly,
should respond to the loss treatment in the expected way.
Table 4 tells us whether preferences and the propensity to make mistakes exhibit
treatment effects. The first four rows of the table feature the switching points in a
Holt and Laury (2002) lottery choice list. Over the full sample, a t-test indicates
that individuals are significantly more risk averse in the gain domain. The pattern
persists in row 2, where we only consider subjects for whom risk preferences were
elicited before the TD was played. Rows 3 and 4 exclude those subjects that did
not switch within the ten options of the HL lottery, thereby revealing themselves to
irrationally preferring a sure 6 Euros to a sure 10.5 Euros. Subjects again exhibit
more risk aversion in the gain domain, although this difference falls just short of
being significant at the 10 percent level when we only consider risk preferences
elicited in the first period. But since HL switching points do not exhibit order
effects (see table 9 in appendix B), we can safely consider the whole sample.
Rows 5 and 6 of table 4 provide the first test of the impact of gain/loss frames
on social preferences we are aware of: subjects playing a dictator game do not
give significantly more in the loss compared to the gain domain. Row 7 indicates
that subjects do significantly better in a quiz about optimal play in the TD, when
they are paid with gains rather than penalised by losses and payoffs in the quiz are
framed as gains rather than losses.
When we transform the TD into an individual decision making task in which
subjects play against a computer who picks a claim at random, subjects make con-
siderably more risk averse choices in the gain domain. Adding a social component
by giving the computer player’s payoffs to another subject does not significantly in-
crease the difference in behaviour between the gain and loss domain. This is made
precise in the last two rows of table 4. To summarise, there is a treatment effect on
risk preferences and the propensity to make mistakes, as captured by the quiz, but
not on social preferences.
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Table 4 Elicited preferences and propensity to make mistakes
Gains Losses
Sample Mean N Mean N Difference
HL switching point full 6.83 36 5.95 42 0.88**
first round 6.72 18 5.62 21 1.10*
HL switching point (<11) full 6.31 32 5.56 39 0.75**
first round 6.19 16 5.35 20 0.84
Dictator giving full 3.14 36 3.21 42 -0.07
first round 3.17 18 3.62 21 -0.45
Quiz score full 5.89 36 4.21 42 1.67***
Risk TD claim full 4.94 36 5.57 42 -0.62**
first round 5.00 18 6.05 21 -1.05***
Social TD claim full 4.72 36 5.37 42 -0.65**
first round 4.81 18 6.00 21 -1.19***
Social TD − Risk TD full -0.22 36 -0.20 42 -0.02
first round -0.19 18 -0.05 21 -0.18
Note: The last column features t-tests on the difference in means between the gain and the
loss treatment: * (p < 0.1), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
4.3.3 Do elicited preferences and propensity to make mistakes correlate
with behaviour in the traveler’s dilemma?
Further suggestive evidence for the mechanism can be gleaned from the correla-
tions between individually elicited subject characteristics and strategic behaviour.
In particular, we expect risk preferences and sophistication, but not social prefer-
ences, to correlate with net claims in the TD.
Table 5 lists the results of eight OLS regressions of net claims in the TD on var-
ious independent variables. Regressions 1 and 2 imply that the correlation between
net claims in the TD and choices in the simple non-strategic TD is higher than the
correlation between strategic play and the non-strategic TD that features a social
motive.24 The absolute value of the coefficient in regression 1 may not be informa-
tive, because, by design, the non-strategic TD and the strategic TD are very similar
and hence, drivers of behaviour unrelated to risk preferences, like focal points in
the action space or the description of the game, could be at work in both. But the
relative difference between the coefficients in regression 1 and regression 2 tells us
that adding a social motive to the independent variable makes it less predictive of
strategic play.
24Because Risk TD claim and Social TD claim both exhibit order effects (see table 9 in appendix
B), regressions 1 and 2 are run over those subjects whose respective risk and social preferences
were elicited before the strategic TD. Since the intersection of these two samples is zero, a valid
regression featuring both Risk TD claim and Social TD claim cannot be run.
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Table 5 Determinants of net claims
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Risk TD claim 0.794***
(0.10)
Social TD claim 0.588***
(0.13)
HL switching point -0.183* -0.145 -0.073* -0.008
(0.10) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03)
Dictator giving -0.067 -0.109 0.008 0.012
(0.10) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03)
Quiz score -0.165** -0.165** -0.095*** -0.094***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02)
Period(s) of TD play 1 1 1 1 1 1 1-5 6-10
N 39 39 71 71 71 71 355 355
R-squared 0.473 0.321 0.048 0.007 0.070 0.119 0.042 0.052
Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors in parenthesis; significance levels of coefficients: * (p < 0.1), ** (p < 0.05),
*** (p < 0.01); Observations with HL switching point = 11 are not included in the regressions.
Regressions 3 through 5 indicate that a subject’s HL switching point and her
performance in the quiz, but not dictator giving, are correlated with claims in the
first period of TD play. Since these independent variables do not exhibit significant
order effects, we can run a regression over the entire sample of subjects and include
measures of risk preferences, social preferences and sophistication. In regression 6,
the quiz score is the only significant independent variable. The HL switching points
falls just short of the 10 percent level.
Regression 7 pools observations from the first 5 periods of TD play: risk prefer-
ences and sophistication exhibit the expected correlation with strategic behaviour.
Regression 8 pools observations form the last 5 periods, after some learning would
have taken place. In these periods, it is mainly subjects that did not fully under-
stand the game (as captured by a low quiz score) that still deviate from Nash play,
while the median subject now plays the lowest action. Thus, the impact of risk
preferences becomes negligible.
In the questionnaire after the experiment we elicited the motives behind sub-
jects’ choices in the TD (see table 10 and 11 in appendix B). Subjects’ answers are
again more consistent with a risk preference explanation than a social preference
explanation of the treatment effect. Subjects in the loss domain consider "trying
to gain a lot" to be a more important reason to choose a high claim and "avoiding
the risk of being undercut" to be a less important reason for choosing a low claim
than subjects in the gain domain.
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5 Further treatments
5.1 Loss avoidance and the gain-loss treatment
In the gain-loss treatment positive as well as negative payoffs were possible.
Subjects were paid a participation fee of 8 Euros, admissible claims lay between
-5 and 0, and R was set at 3 Euros. The gain-loss treatment allows us to observe
behaviour around the reference point, not just behaviour approaching it from the
right or from the left as in the gain and the loss treatments, respectively. For
comparability with the other treatments, we again think in terms of net claims x
and payoffs z. Hence, the experimentally induced reference point lies at z = 8,
which we obtain by adding the participation fee to the true reference point of zero.
A risk-preference-based explanation implies that average claims in the gain-loss
treatment should lie between average claims in the loss and the gain treatment.
And indeed, the observed distribution of net claims in Figure 3a peaks at around
5, as opposed to 6 in the loss treatment and 3 in the gain treatment.
In order to devise a more stringent test of whether or not the observed behaviour
is consistent with diminishing sensitivity, we use the experimental data to estimate






Depending on the parameter values, this function (Prelec, 1998) can be convex,
concave, S-shaped or have an inverted S-shape. Furthermore, when it has an S-
shape, the parameter values endogenously pin down its point of inflection.26 We
are interested in whether the observed distribution of claims is best explained or
rationalised by the exact shape of the value function that diminishing sensitivity
implies. That is, whether our estimated value function is S-shaped with its point
of infection at the experimentally induced reference point at z = 8.
Our estimates are in table 12 in appendix B. As before, we estimate the cognitive
hierarchy model both separately for each period and jointly under the restriction
that γ and δ remain constant. We also estimate the model under the risk neutrality
restriction (γ = 1 and δ = 1). We reject the risk-neutrality restriction in favour of
an S-shaped utility that bears a remarkable resemblance to what prospect theory
25We again perform all estimates using net claims. Dividing payoffs by the maximal gain (10.9)
is a normalisation which ensures that the argument of the function lies in [0, 1].
26The function precludes a kink and we are therefore abstracting from loss aversion much like
the many papers that assume a piecewise linear value function with a kink at the reference point
abstract from diminishing sensitivity.
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(a) Distribution of claims





(b) Estimated utility function
Figure 3 Gain-loss treatment
would suggest. Figure 3b plots the estimated utility function with estimates from
the first period (γ̂ = 3 and δ̂ = 26).
To understand how a reference point of z = 8 generates the pronounced peak in
the frequency of observed claims at x = 5, note that the S-shaped utility function
implies that the value that a subject attaches to small increases in earnings is very
high around the reference point. She will therefore be very keen to avoid earning
less than z = 8. That is, she may act almost as if to maximise her chance of not
earning less than z = 8. Since R = 3, this is achieved by playing x = 5.
Subjects in the gain-loss treatment play to avoid losses and this loss avoidance
follows naturally from prospect theory’s value function and strategic uncertainty.
Our results thus also hint at a possible microfoundation for loss avoidance as an
equilibrium selection principle, which Cachon and Camerer (1996) document in the
context of a coordination game.
The gain-loss treatment also allows us to address a potential concern that our
main treatment effect is a house money effect, by which subjects become more
risk-loving if they are endowed with free money by the experimenter. The above
results suggest that our framing works as intended, to the surprising extent that
experimentally induced and theoretical reference points coincide.27
27 More generally, evidence for house money effects is still limited. Thaler and Johnson (1990)
mostly rely on an unincentivised part of their experiment to document the effect and Clark (2002)
finds that house money effects do not seem to play a role in public good games, although Harrison
(2007) shows that this statement is only true for the intensive margin of contributions. Note that
if house money effects played a role in our experiment, our central implication that higher risk
tolerance causes cooperation would remain in tact.
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(a) Distribution of claims

















(b) Average claims per period
Figure 4 The traveler’s dilemma with R = 0.5
5.2 The traveler’s dilemma with a small R
In experiment 1, after five rounds of the TD with R = 3, we let subjects play
five additional rounds with R = 0.5, both in the gain and the loss treatment. This
change allows us to verify whether a lower reward/punishment parameter leads to
higher average claims, as in previous studies (e.g. Capra et al. 1999). It also allows
us to observe subjects’ behaviour in a game in which we expect the impact of risk
preferences on behaviour to be smaller.28
Figure 4a depicts the distribution of claims, pooling the 5 periods, while figure
4b reports per-period averages. Average net claims are 6.55 and 5.91 in the gain
and loss treatment respectively. In both treatments, we confirm previous findings
that reducing R increases average claims. Moreover, observed claims are higher in
the gain treatment.29
This difference is consistent with subjects being less sophisticated in the loss
domain and a low R dampening the effect of asymmetries in risk preferences. Note
that, in the presence of strategic uncertainty, a sophisticated player’s optimal action
is decreasing in R (Baghestanian, 2014). However, in the loss domain a lower
fraction of players make the adjustment, resulting in lower average net claims.
To further demonstrate that the results of the R = 0.5 treatment are consistent
28In the limit case of R = 0, risk preferences become completely irrelevant because playing the
highest action becomes a dominant strategy.
29Because we let subjects play the R = 0.5 part after our main treatment with R = 3, results
could be susceptible to order effects. At the same time, we have reason to believe order effects
are small and working against the relationship we uncover. In particular, Capra et al. (1999) find
that in within subject sequential treatments in which R was varied, higher (lower) claims in an
initial treatment lead to slightly higher (lower) claims in the following treatment.
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Table 6 Predicted and actual mean net claims when R = 0.5
Treatment Estimates from R = 3 Predicted mean Actual mean
Gain (α, t, w) = (1.08, 0.716, 0.078) 6.59 6.55
Loss (α, t, w) = (3.41, 0.18, 0.06) 5.95 5.91
Note: Predicted mean net claims are obtained by using average parameter estimates
over the 5 periods from table 2.
with our suggested mechanism, we perform an out-of-sample forecasts of the model
of section 4.2. That is, we generate predicted mean claims for R = 0.5 using param-
eter estimates from the R = 3 rounds. Table 6 demonstrates how the theoretically
simulated mean is higher in the gain domain as well as how predicted and actual
means are remarkably close.
The case of R = 0.5 demonstrates that our main treatment effect arises pri-
marily when raising one’s claim entails a sizeable downside risk because potential
punishment and forgone reward are high, i.e. it arises in high-risk situations like
the real-world social dilemmas we seek to capture.
6 Conclusion
We find that individuals are more likely to take a chance on one another when
losses are at stake. The prospect of losses can induce cooperation in a social dilemma
because people’s risk tolerance and lower sophistication in the loss domain drive
them to deviate from Nash play. Our experiment also begins to pin down the scope
of this mechanism. It is more likely to pay a role when there is much strategic
uncertainty, as in the early periods of our experiment, and when the payoff variance
is high, as in our treatments with R = 3. An appreciation of how diminishing
sensitivity impacts on strategic behaviour then also points to when and how a loss
frame is likely to impact on behaviour in non-linear public good games, prisoner’s
dilemmas, coordination games and Bertrand competition.
Our results suggest that politicians who seek to foster cooperation amongst the
different stakeholders to a reform or policy initiative may find it useful to evoke
a loss frame. The loss frame may not only increase the perceived stakes through
loss aversion, but also foster cooperation through the mechanism we uncover in this
paper. Indeed, leaders that wish to garner support for war, will often exaggerat-
edly point to the "threat to our way of life" the enemy poses. Similarly, economic
reforms are often advertised as the only way to "remain competitive" or "avoid slid-
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ing deeper into recession". However, our analysis also implies that cooperation will
primarily emerge in uncertain settings and that it will decline as players gain expe-
rience. Therefore, a loss frame is probably most potently applied under exceptional
circumstances and cannot be exploited repeatedly.
A manager may want to keep subordinates from cooperating to provide low ef-
fort or organising to demand higher wages. As a result, she may try to evoke the
gain frame whenever possible, for example, by attempting to hide necessary cuts
in real wages behind nominal wage increases. Abeler et al. (2011) and Fryer et al.
(2012) find that by embedding payment schemes in the loss domain, loss aversion
can be leveraged as a cheap way to increase effort in the lab and in the field respec-
tively. Furthermore, De Quidt (2014) finds that doing so has no negative impact
on employee participation. In light of this evidence, it is puzzling that the loss
frame is not more widely used as incentive device. Our results speak to this puzzle.
Where the organisational structure involves complicated games between employers
and several employees, for example in a labor tournament setting, employee co-
operation fuelled by risk tolerance may undermine the incentives to provide effort
generated by loss aversion.
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Proof of Proposition 1. The difference between the lhs and rhs of equation (1)
is increasing in p, positive when p = 1 and negative when p = 0. There thus exists
a unique threshold for which player 1 is indifferent between playing 3 and m. This
threshold is given by
p∗ =
U(3)− U(3−R)
U(3)− U(3−R) + U(m+R)− U(3 +R)
,
which is decreasing in m.
To show that p∗i < p
∗
























with m+R > c > 3+R and 3 > b > 3−R. From the definitions of risk preferences
and the fact that c > b it follows that U
′(c)
U ′(b)




under risk neutrality, and U
′(c)
U ′(b)






Proof of Proposition 2. When U(z1; z2) = z1 + βz2, the best deviation from
x1 = 3 is either x1 = m or x1 = m+ 0.1, depending on whether
m+R + β(m−R) ≥ m+ 0.1 + β(m+ 0.1),
that is, on whether β ≤ R−0.1
R+0.1
≡ β̂. If β ≤ β̂, the best deviation is x1 = m and



















The difference between the lhs and rhs of equation (5) is increasing in p, positive





m+R− 3 + (m− 3)β
,
which is decreasing in β and m.
When β > β̂, the best deviation is x1 = m + 0.1 and player 1 finds it strictly


















The difference between the lhs and rhs of this inequality is again increasing in p,





10(m+ (m+R)β − 29(1 + β))
,
which is also decreasing in β and m. To conclude the proof, let p∗β be equal to
p∗
β≤β̂
for β ≤ β̂ and to p∗
β>β̂





when β = β̂.
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B Additional material
Table 7 The HL risk preference elicitation task in the gain treatment
Row Option L Option R Implied α
1 6 with p = 110 ; 5 with p =
9
10 10.5 with p =
1
10 ; 0.5 with p =
9
10 α ≥ 3.32
2 6 with p = 210 ; 5 with p =
8
10 10.5 with p =
2
10 ; 0.5 with p =
8
10 2.29 ≤ α < 3.32
3 6 with p = 310 ; 5 with p =
7
10 10.5 with p =
3
10 ; 0.5 with p =
7
10 1.75 ≤ α < 2.29
4 6 with p = 410 ; 5 with p =
6
10 10.5 with p =
4
10 ; 0.5 with p =
6
10 1.34 ≤ α < 1.75
5 6 with p = 510 ; 5 with p =
5
10 10.5 with p =
5
10 ; 0.5 with p =
5
10 1 ≤ α < 1.34
6 6 with p = 610 ; 5 with p =
4
10 10.5 with p =
6
10 ; 0.5 with p =
4
10 0.68 ≤ α < 1
7 6 with p = 710 ; 5 with p =
3
10 10.5 with p =
7
10 ; 0.5 with p =
3
10 0.37 ≤ α < 0.68
8 6 with p = 810 ; 5 with p =
2
10 10.5 with p =
8
10 ; 0.5 with p =
2
10 0.018 ≤ α < 0.37
9 6 with p = 910 ; 5 with p =
1
10 10.5 with p =
9
10 ; 0.5 with p =
1
10 0 < α < 0.018
10 6 with p = 1010 ; 5 with p =
0
10 10.5 with p =
10




Note: Values in the last column obtain by assuming a utility of the form U(x) = xα. The
task in the loss treatment is identical, except that 11 is subtracted from each outcome.
Table 8 The dictator task in the gain treatment
Choice Consequences
1 you obtain 11; the other person obtains 3
2 you obtain 10; the other person obtains 4
3 you obtain 9; the other person obtains 5
4 you obtain 8; the other person obtains 6
5 you obtain 7; the other person obtains 7
6 you obtain 6; the other person obtains 8
7 you obtain 5; the other person obtains 9
8 you obtain 4; the other person obtains 10
9 you obtain 3; the other person obtains 11
Note: The task in the loss treatment is identical ex-
cept that 11 is subtracted from each outcome.
34
Table 9 Order effects in elicited preferences
First round Last round
Treatment Mean N Mean N Difference
HL switching point Gain 6.72 18 6.94 18 -0.22
Loss 5.62 21 6.28 21 -0.66
HL switching point (<11) Gain 6.19 16 6.44 16 -0.25
Loss 5.35 20 5.79 19 -0.44
Dictator giving Gain 3.17 18 3.11 18 0.05
Loss 3.62 21 2.81 21 0.81
Risk TD claim Gain 5.00 18 4.89 18 0.11
Loss 6.05 21 5.10 21 0.95**
Social TD claim Gain 4.81 18 4.64 18 0.16
Loss 6.00 21 4.74 21 1.26***
Note: The last column features t-tests on the difference in means between subjects
who performed the task in the first and the last round: * (p < 0.1), ** (p < 0.05),
*** (p < 0.01).
Table 10 Self-reported explanations of play (importance on a 1 to 4 scale)
Gains Losses
Mean N Mean N Difference
Reasons to choose a high claim
• try to gain a lot 2.38 36 2.71 42 -.32*
• let the other gain a lot 2.3 36 2.16 42 .13
• reward who chooses a high claim 2.44 36 2.4 42 .03
• it is fair 2.3 36 2.4 42 -.09
Reasons to choose a low claim
• avoid the risk of being undercut 3.69 36 3.26 42 .43***
• let the other gain little 2 36 2.3 42 -.309
• punish who plays a low claim 2 36 2.42 42 -.42***
• it is rational 3.08 36 3.04 42 -.03
Note: The last column features t-tests on the difference in means between the gain and the loss treatment: *
(p < 0.1), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
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Table 11 Self-reported opinions on social norms (% of "yes")
Gains Losses
Mean N Mean N Difference
A plays a high claim and B a low one
• is B unfair? 25% 36 23.8% 42 1.2%
• would you incur a cost to punish B ? 41.6% 36 38.1% 42 3.5%
Note: The last column features t-tests on the difference in means between the gain and the loss treatment: *
(p < 0.1), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
Table 12 Estimates for the gain-loss treatment
Treatment Period Restriction γ δ t w LogL
Gain-Loss 1 none 3∗∗∗ 28∗∗∗ 0.21 0.15 −120.634
(0.261) (6.045) (0.096) (0.053)
2 none 3.5∗∗∗ 34∗∗∗ 0.21 0 −128.64
(0.222) (5.319) (0.0849) (0.023)
3 none 4∗∗∗ 22∗∗∗ 0.41 0.05 −117.331
(0.196) (2.87) (0.131) (0.047)
4 none 4∗∗∗ 19∗∗∗ 0.31 0.05 −122.311
(0.223) (3.198) (0.122) (0.05)
5 none 4 22 0.21 0.05 −129.312
(0.832) (7.226) (0.064) (0.024)
all 5 γ & δ const 4∗∗∗ 19∗∗∗ −623.583
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; significance levels from a likelihood-
ratio test against the restriction γ = δ = 1: * (p < 0.1), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
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Online Appendix
C Instructions for the loss treatment of experiment
2 (translation from French)
Welcome to the experimental laboratory of the Toulouse School of Economics and
thank you for participating in this experiment. The data we collect is anonymous
and will be used for scientific purposes only.
You received 11AC as a payment for your participation.
The total amount of money you will earn depends on your decisions as well as on
those of the other participants.
Please do not ask questions out loud during the experiment. If you do have a ques-
tion or if an error message that you do not understand appears on your screen,
please raise your hand and we will answer your question individually. Also, we
kindly ask you not to talk or in any other way communicate with other participants
during this experiment.
Some general information:
• If during the experiment you obtain a negative amount of money, you will
have to reimburse the corresponding sum by using part of the 11AC that you
received at the beginning of the experiment. Earning a negative amount thus
implies a loss.
• During the experiment, every time you are paired with another person he or
she will be a different person (you will never be paired with the same person
twice).
• Only some of your decisions will be relevant for your final payment, as ex-
plained in detail later on. But it is important to keep in mind that each
decision might determine your final earnings. Thus, it is essential that you
understand how your earnings in each decision problem are calculated.
• The expression "selected at random" means that all possible outcomes have
the same probability. For example, if one of three given numbers is "selected
at random", each number has a probability of 1/3 of being selected.
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• You have to use the period as decimal separator and even if you want to insert
an integer you have to type the number followed by the decimal part (e.g. "1"
has to be written as "1.0"). In order to insert a negative number just add a
"-" (e.g. "-1.0").
The experiment consists of two parts, A and B. Part A is about to begin.
Please do NOT turn the page before we instruct you to do so. Thank you.
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PART A
Part A consists of 12 periods. Only one of the 12 periods will be selected at random
at the end of the experiment and will determine your earnings.
Periods 2 to 11 are identical and below you are given the instructions for these
periods. Periods 1 and 12 are slightly different and the instructions will appear
directly on your screen.
Instructions for periods 2 to 11
During each period from 2 to 11, you will be paired with another participant (a
different participant in each period). Each of you has to choose a value between
-8.0AC and -3.0AC (-8AC and -3AC included). Half units are allowed: e.g. "-5.5"
means negative 5 Euros and 50 Euro-cents. The values you are allowed to choose
in ascending order are:
-8.0 -7.5 -7.0 -6.5 -6.0 -5.5 -5.0 -4.5 -4.0 -3.5 -3.0
Note that, as you are dealing with negative numbers, the smallest number is the
one that has the highest absolute value (e.g. -4 is smaller than -3.5).
Your earnings are determined as follows (remember that earning a negative amount
represents a loss):
• If the values you and your partner choose are equal, each of you earns that
value.
• If the two values differ, each of you earns the minimum of the two values.
In addition, 3AC will be added to the earnings of the person who chose the
smaller value and 3AC will be deducted from the earnings of the person
who chose the larger value.
For example, if you and your partner both choose -4.0: both of you earn -4AC (you
both lose 4AC).
If you choose -5.0 and your partner chooses -4.5: you earn -5AC + 3AC= -2AC (you
lose 2AC) and your partner earns -5AC -3AC = -8AC (your partner loses 8AC).
If you choose -3.0 and your partner chooses -3.5: you earn -3.5AC - 3AC= -6.5AC (you
lose 6.5AC) and your partner earns -3.5AC + 3AC= -0.5AC (your partner loses 0.5AC).
Make sure you understand how the earnings in these examples are calculated.
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Note: All the remaining instructions appeared on
screen.
Instructions for period 1 (or 12)
In this period you are paired with another participant (with whom you neither have
been already nor will again be paired). Both of you face the same two scenarios
and in each scenario you have to make a decision that impacts on your earnings
as well as those of your partner. Randomly, either one of your two decisions
or one of the two decisions made by your partner is selected to determine
your actual earnings for this period. So, unlike in periods 2-11, earnings are not
simultaneously determined by your decision and the one of your partner.
For example, if your decision from the 2nd scenario is selected, it will determine your
earnings as well as your partner’s earnings for this period. If your partner’s decision from
the 1st scenario is selected, his/her decision determines his/her earnings as well as yours
for this period.
Scenario 1: Just like in periods 2-11, you have to choose a value between -8AC
and -3AC (-8.0 and -3.0 are included; half-units are allowed) and the same rules
apply to calculate your earnings and those of your partner. The only difference is
that the value of your partner is not chosen by himself/herself, but instead,
randomly by the computer.
If, for example, you choose -5.0 and the computer -4.5, you earn -5AC + 3AC = -2AC (you
lose 2AC) and your partner earns -5AC -3AC = -8AC (loses 8AC).
Scenario 2: You have to choose one of the options described in the table. The
chosen option determines your earnings as well as those of your partner (we remind
you that earning a negative value corresponds to a loss). As you move down the
table, the loss of your partner decreases, while your loss increases.
If, for example, you choose option 3, you receive -2AC (you lose 2AC) and your partner
receives -6AC (loses 6AC).
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Choice Consequences
1 you obtain 0 ; the other person obtains -8
2 you obtain -1; the other person obtains -7
3 you obtain -2; the other person obtains -6
4 you obtain -3; the other person obtains -5
5 you obtain -4; the other person obtains -4
6 you obtain -5; the other person obtains -3
7 you obtain -6; the other person obtains -2
8 you obtain -7; the other person obtains -1
9 you obtain -8; the other person obtains 0
Instructions for period 12 (or 1)
In this period, you are not paired with another participant. You will face two
scenarios and one of your choices will randomly be selected to determine your
earnings for this period.
Scenario 1: Just like in periods 2-11, you have to choose a value between -8AC
and -3AC (-8.0 and -3.0 are included; half-units are allowed) and the same rules
apply to calculate your earnings. The difference is that the other value used to
calculate your earnings is not chosen by another person but randomly by the
computer.
If, for example, you choose -5.0 and the computer -4.5, you earn -5AC+ 3AC= -2AC (you
lose 2AC).
Scenario 2: You face 10 decision problems (described in the table). A single
decision problem will randomly be selected to determine your earnings. You have
to choose between option L and option R. Take a look at decision 1 in the
table. With option L, you earn -5AC (lose 5AC) with a probability of 1/10 and you
earn -6AC (lose 6AC) with a probability of 9/10. With option R, you earn -0.5AC
(lose 0.5AC) with a probability of 1/10 and you earn -10.5AC (lose 10.5AC) with a
probability of 9/10. The other decision problems are similar, except for the fact
that as you move down the table, the probability of the most favourable outcome
for each option increases. Moreover, we note that for decision problem 10 in the
last line, both options definitely bring you the most favourable outcome and you
actually have to choose between receiving -5AC (loosing 5AC) or -0.5AC (losing 0.5AC).
Suppose in decision 7 you chose option R and decision 7 is selected to determine your
earnings. With a probability of 7/10 you receive -0.5AC (lose 0.5AC) and with a probability
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of 3/10 you receive -10.5AC (lose 10.5AC).
Row Option L Option R
1 -5 with p = 1
10
; -6 with p = 9
10
-0.5 with p = 1
10
; -10.5 with p = 9
10
2 -5 with p = 2
10
; -6 with p = 8
10
-0.5 with p = 2
10
; -10.5 with p = 8
10
3 -5 with p = 3
10
; -6 with p = 7
10
-0.5 with p = 3
10
; -10.5 with p = 7
10
4 -5 with p = 4
10
; -6 with p = 6
10
-0.5 with p = 4
10
; -10.5 with p = 6
10
5 -5 with p = 5
10
; -6 with p = 5
10
-0.5 with p = 5
10
; -10.5 with p = 5
10
6 -5 with p = 6
10
; -6 with p = 4
10
-0.5 with p = 6
10
; -10.5 with p = 4
10
7 -5 with p = 7
10
; -6 with p = 3
10
-0.5 with p = 7
10
; -10.5 with p = 3
10
8 -5 with p = 8
10
; -6 with p = 2
10
-0.5 with p = 8
10
; -10.5 with p = 2
10
9 -5 with p = 9
10
; -6 with p = 1
10
-0.5 with p = 9
10
; -10.5 with p = 1
10
10 -5 with p = 10
10
;-6 with p = 0
10
-0.5 with p = 10
10




Part B is a quiz about periods 2-11 from Part A. There are 10 questions and you
have 30 seconds per question (if you do not respond within the time limit, your
response will be considered as incorrect). For your participation in the quiz you
receive 9AC that will be added to you final payment of Part A. For every wrong
answer, you will lose 0.5AC of your 9AC payment for the quiz. If the question asks
you to give an estimate, the penalty for an incorrect estimate is 1AC and your esti-
mate is considered correct if it lies between plus and minus 1 from the exact answer.
Suppose that in this period you chose the value -6.5 and you partner chose -6.0.
• How much do you receive in this period?
• How much does your partner receive in this period?
How many admissible values are strict lower than -4.5?
Suppose that in this period you chose the value -7.0 and you receive -4AC. Which
is the smallest value (the most negative one) that your partner could have chosen
in this period?
Suppose that in this period your partner will choose -8.0 with a probability of 30%
and -4.0 with a probability of 70%.
• What are your average earnings if you choose -8.0?
• Which value would maximise your average gains (and thus minimise your
average loss)?
Suppose that in this period your partner will choose -8.0 with a probability of 30%
and -7.5 with a probability of 70%.
• What are you average earnings if you choose -8.0?
• Which value would maximise your average gains (and thus minimise your
average loss)?
What is your estimate for the average number of correct responses given by the
other participants to the 8 first questions of this test?
What is your estimate for the number of questions that you answered correctly (for
the first 8 questions of this test)?
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Questionnaire
The experiment is over. We now ask you to complete this questionnaire.
The questions concern periods 2-11 from Part A.
Which, according to you, is the fair value to choose?
Which is the least risky value?
For each of the following statements, indicate whether you think that it represents
a valid reason (not at all important, of small importance, quite important, very
important) to choose a high value (meaning a less negative value):
1. The other person will probably choose a high value and thus it is in my best
interest to do the same.
2. The other person will probably choose a high value and I do not like to choose
a value lower than hers.
3. It is the right thing to do because if everybody does so, both participants
(partner and myself) benefit.
4. Choosing a high value is more risky than choosing a lower value, but I prefer
trying my luck.
For each of the following statements, indicate whether you think that it represents
a valid reason (not at all important, of small importance, quite important, very
important) to choose a low value (meaning a more negative value):
1. I want to choose a lower value than the other person.
2. The other person will probably choose a low value and I do not want her value
to be smaller than mine.
3. There is nothing bad about choosing a low value and it is in my interest to
do so.
4. Choosing a low value is less risky than choosing a high value.
Suppose player A plays a high value and player B a low value.
• Do you think that player B is being unfair?
• Would you be willing to incur a personal cost to punish him?
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